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Exploring Relationships between Time, Law and Social 
Ordering: A Curated Conversation 
 
 
Emily Grabham:* Coordinator and participant  






When I first set out on the task of researching time and temporalities, I came 
across a strange type of academic artifact. It was a structured email conversation 
about time published in an academic journal devoted to lesbian and gay studies.  
This was the wonderful piece “Theorizing Queer Temporalities: A Roundtable 
Discussion”, which appeared in GLQ in 2007 (Dinshaw et al., 2007). The 
conversation itself had taken place through what I imagined to have been a 
series of disjointed, often overlapping discussions, queries, and interventions. 
Yet as a published article it was coherent, often light-hearted, and specific about 
how the contributors had thought about time in relation to sexuality, race, 
gender, and culture.  Here was Carolyn Dinshaw, for example, talking about her 
queer desire for history and about imagining the possibility of touching across 
time.  Here was Nguyen Tan Hoang talking about the transmission of queer 
experience across generations, and Roderick A. Ferguson talking about how the 
“unwed mother” and the “priapic black heterosexual male” figured outside of the 
rational time of capital, nationhood, and family (Dinshaw et al., 2007, p. 180).  
Here was Jack Halberstam recalling a point in childhood when time and 
temporality became vitally important: 
 
I am in a grammar school in England in the 1970s, and in assembly hall 
the headmistress wants to let the girls know that it is our responsibility to 
dress appropriately so as not to “incite” the male teachers to regrettable 
actions. This, she says, will be good training for us, since we are here to 
prepare ourselves for marriage and family. I hear a loud voice in my head 
saying fuck family, fuck marriage, fuck the male teachers, this is not my 
life, that will not be my time line. (Dinshaw et al., 2007, p. 182) 
 
In a short introduction, Elizabeth Freeman, convenor of the virtual roundtable, 
confessed her temporal pruning of these interventions. She said: “I edited the 
results for continuity, occasionally shifting a remark to an ‘earlier’ or ‘later’ place 
in the conversation, cutting digressions or adding transitions”. She 
acknowledged that this produced a different “temporality, polyvocality, and 
virtual space” from the “real time” of a face to face roundtable (Dinshaw et al., 
2007, p. 177). I came to admire Freeman’s weaving of anecdote and exposition, 
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inquiry and reflection, as she stitched together an enlivening narrative from 
participants’ thoughtful reflections. Freeman’s edited email conversation 
avoided many of the over-worn debates about time then circulating in the 
humanities and introduced much of the specificity and un-evenness of the 
contributors’ own work, tethered as it was to distinct inquiries, contexts, and 
political projects. The fact that email was the chosen medium was refreshingly 
‘low-fi’, adopting one of the tools of the academic working day for a conversation 
about time, political power, culture, and knowledge-production. The edited email 
conversation contained sparks of insight, and new questions, that have enriched 
my own research journey many times over the years. 
 
From 2015 to 2017, the sociologist Siân Beynon-Jones and I coordinated a 
scholarly network on law and time: the Regulating Time network, which was 
funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. 1 Our aim with this 
network was to foster interdisciplinary conversations about law’s relationship 
with time and temporalities. It seemed to be a particularly good moment to think 
about this, because the intensity of debates around law and time seemed to be 
increasing. Earlier articles and books by ‘law and society’ and ‘law and 
anthropology’ scholars, had explored the rationalities of time inhabited by 
distinct communities and what these had to say about mechanisms of sociality 
and governance (Engel, 1987; Greenhouse, 1996; Richland, 2013). Over the 
years, this scholarship had been augmented and further enriched by reflections 
from feminist legal theory (Chryssostalis and Drakopoulou, 2013; Conaghan, 
2006; van Marle, 2003), post and anti-colonialist perspectives (Keenan, 2015; 
Mawani, 2014), international law and human rights (Craven et al., 2006; Johns, 
2016), and critical legal theory (McNeilly, 2017; Valverde, 2015). To indulge in a 
bit of ad-hoc periodization, it is arguably possible to identify a period running 
from a couple of years before the network began, right up to the present moment 
when research on law and time has only just become a more regular feature of 
academic events, projects and publications. This in many ways has mirrored the 
‘temporal turn’ in social science and humanities research over the past decade, 
which itself has seen a flourishing in networks, research initiatives, and 
publications on time: the GLQ roundtable was an early example of this wave of 
‘time work’, as have been the Temporal Belongings and Austerity Futures 
networks, the Black Quantum Futurism and Future Matters collectives, and the 
Waiting Times project, for example.2  
 
From lunchtime chats or other informal exchanges with colleagues, Siân and I 
had seen points of resonance emerging across law and sociology research on 
time, and we wanted to develop these conversations to reach out to more 
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disciplines and a wider range of scholars. At some point in this enjoyable, if 
rather energetic, endeavour, I began wondering about how we might capture the 
more informal conversations that the network was producing.  We eventually 
published an edited collection – named Law and Time - from an open call 
through the network (Beynon-Jones and Grabham, 2018), but we also wanted to 
capture the fleeting moments of insight and exchange that we found so engaging 
through the network’s many events, which raised slightly different questions of 
theory and practice.  
 
Siân joked about a year into the network that she had never realized that it 
would be largely about counting vegetarian sausage rolls,3 although to be fair, 
she often managed to do this whilst talking about the gendered temporal-legal 
politics of abortion. And this, essentially, is the point of the curated conversation: 
to acknowledge the value of our more haphazard research conversations about 
law and time, which emerged (and still emerge) in strange places, on the edges of 
events, or during other activities. Indeed, we discovered that even in what felt 
like the more organizational aspects of the work, ideas about law and time still 
somehow had a habit of getting through. Many of the most interesting 
conversations took place in harried, partial encounters with speakers and 
participants: walking from here to there; packing and unpacking boxes of 
programmes; feeding ourselves and others with institutional catering products 
of varying quality. Even the most carefully balanced conference schedules were 
often upstaged in moments between the last tepid coffee of the day and the first 
drink in the pub, when we were packing up and trying not to leave the 
institutional laptop behind, and someone would get a text saying that an 
esteemed plenary speaker had been stranded on a ring-road outside town, and 
somebody else would mention, for example, that did we know Nasser Hussain 
had written about the colonial politics of emergency (Hussain, 2009)?  
 
Co-ordinating and participating in academic networks involves working in the 
medium of months-long email conversations and frantic half-finished chats as 
much as through beautifully constructed workshop papers or polished journal 
articles. And there’s something useful about the un-finishedness of these 
encounters. The errant temporality of ideas unfolding across formal and less 
formal spaces can be just as generative of academic inquiry, perhaps even more 
so, than the serious publications we go on to produce (Berg and Seeber, 2016). 
There’s something alive in the midst of all these emails, workshop contributions, 
conversations with colleagues, and lunches, and if pressed, I would suggest that 
it’s a sort of amphibious academic creature, suited to the solid ground of formal 
academic conferences as much as the more fluid environment of everyday 
encounters and informal debate.  
 
Inspired by Freeman’s quasi-heroic capture of email in the service of academic 
debates on gender, sexuality, time and culture, then, I wanted to find a way of 
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discerning our own amphibious creature, harnessing some of the unruly, 
distractable, yet strangely productive energy of the Regulating Time network, 
without capturing the creature entirely and forcing it to behave in a way that it 
did not want to. After finding a group of feminist scholars across law, sociology 
and anthropology who agreed to participate in an email discussion, and after 
scoping some potential topics for the conversation, we embarked on a 
conversation unfolding over four days across time zones between Europe and 
North America. The participants are engaged in research across feminist, critical 
race, queer, and/or postcolonial studies and have brought these scholarly 
inheritances to the task of thinking about time. For example, Amade M’charek’s 
ethnographic work has shown how race is constructed through particular modes 
of folding time found in genetic practices (M’charek, 2014), Emma Cunliffe’s 
socio-legal research has followed the gendered temporalizing effects of expert 
evidence in cases of unexplained infant death (Cunliffe, 2011), and Sarah Keenan 
has analysed how land registries and their associated technicalities intervene in 
the temporalities of property and belonging otherwise at play in colonized 
spaces (Keenan, 2018). As participants’ research suggests, diverse people, laws, 
objects, and historical flows come into focus when exploring how concepts and 
practices of time can be conjured and transformed. Renisa Mawani’s work on the 
travels of the Komagata Maru steamship between Hong Kong, Vancouver and 
Calcutta in 1914 uses “oceans as method” for understanding how ships 
inaugurated new forms of global time (Mawani, 2018). Stacy Douglas proffers 
museums and their associated temporalizing practices as a focus for exploring 
the centrality of sovereignty in public memorialization (Douglas, 2017). 
 
With these concerns and intellectual inheritances, we began by articulating some 
of our research dilemmas in exploring law’s relationship with time, and mapping 
out how we had become interested in time in our research, trying to summarise 
where it had taken us. Some of us had been pondering the significance of 
thinking about time as legal theorists using, and having difficulties with, theories 
of space. Others were questioning what was distinct about legal scholarship and 
legal forms of knowledge when compared with approaches to time in other 
disciplines. Understanding how race emerges in and through legal practices and 
temporal epistemologies also became a key feature of the conversation, thereby 
intersecting with recent work on race in critical geography (Krupar and Ehlers, 
2017) and, more generally, the rise of scholarly and creative work on black 
quantum futurism (Phillips, 2015). We reflected on, and compared, the theories 
and theorists that had influenced us and began to reflect on the effects of 
diverging conceptual approaches to time. The conversation ended because time 
ran out, and many of us felt that we could have returned to elaborate on 
particular features of the discussion. 
 
I had initially wanted to present this conversation exactly as it happened, 
eschewing the retrospective tidying that Freeman and her colleagues used. But 
our own need for order, and the temptation to create something just that little 
bit more coherent, took the better of us. The discussion took place over several 
days, with contributors pitching in around teaching, caring, and other 
commitments, starting and re-starting conversations that had been begun or 







dropped hours or days earlier, and often overlapping. After it had concluded, I 
created a long ‘transcript’ of the conversation by piecing it together from emails 
in chronological order. When I circulated the transcript, it became clear that 
some tidying of themes would need to happen. Subsequent drafts have identified 
the clear(er) conceptual strands in the conversation and eliminated much of the 
raucous over-talking or disjunctive questioning and answering. And so what is 
presented below is my edit of our own brief, lo-fi excursion into temporalities, 
legalities and social ordering. It’s only the beginning of the conversation, and we 
look forward to continuing it with you over coming years in a kaleidoscope of 
alternately hasty and measured, provisional and thoughtful encounters, which, 




Emily Grabham: I thought we could start with a broad question: How did you 
come to work on time and temporalities in your own research? 
 
Sarah Keenan: My previous work focused on property as it is produced through 
law and space.  In my work I draw heavily on geographer Doreen Massey’s 
definition of space as “dynamic, heterogenous simultaneity” (Massey, 2006).  As 
this is a very temporal definition, I have recently moved to interrogate the 
relationship between space and time - how property is produced through legal 
temporalities, and how legal temporalities are produced through property.  In 
my most recent work focussing on land title registration I argue that there is a 
disjuncture between the temporality of registered titles and the temporality of 
the land to which those titles pertain: registered title and land are out of 
sync.  This temporal disjuncture renders some residents’ connections with land 
temporary and unlawful, turning them into bodies to be removed from the land 
and thereby reproducing categories of race. 
 
I came to time via space.  In my previous work on property I wanted to think 
about what space does to produce property, and I engaged with legal and human 
geography to think through that question.  I was particularly enamoured with 
Massey’s understanding of places as “articulated moments in networks of social 
relations and understandings” (Massey, 1993).  Massey’s argument is that space 
is not static, but rather is actively produced all the time, in no fixed shape or 
direction.  I found this argument politically exciting because it opens the 
possibility for radical political change to be realized in the here and now rather 
than in an always unreachable future. 
 
Massey’s book For Space is set up as an argument for space, rather than time, to 
be understood as the element of change and of ‘becoming’ (Massey, 2006).  But 
at some point I realized that Massey’s understandings of both space and place 
are themselves very temporal - space as dynamic simultaneity, places as 
moments.  Setting up a dichotomy between time and space, and arguing that one 
or the other is the more useful analytical framework seems unnecessary and 
perhaps counter-productive.  Time and space are intertwined, and so I moved to 
thinking about the temporality of property - what time does to produce 






property.  I argued in my book that a level of permanence is required for 
something or someone to belong in the way I was thinking about property; if 
something or someone belongs only fleetingly, then it is more likely a loan, a joke 
or a protest that has occurred rather than a shift in property relations, because 
ultimately that something or someone belongs somewhere else (Keenan, 
2015).  I then went on to think about inheritance on the one hand, and futures 
trading on the other - property relations that appear to have very different 
temporalities.  These are themes I am still working on now. 
 
Renisa Mawani: My works sits at the nexus of critical theory and colonial legal 
history. My first book, Colonial Proximities (Mawani, 2009) details the legal 
encounters between indigenous peoples, Chinese migrants, “mixed-race” 
populations, and Europeans in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century 
British Columbia. My second book, Across Oceans of Law (Mawani, 2018), is a 
global and maritime legal history of the British-built and Japanese-owned 
steamship, S.S. Komagata Maru. The book draws on oceans as method to trace the 
ship’s 1914 route across the Pacific and Indian Oceans, to advance the argument 
that legal forms of colonial and racial violence are deeply entangled, and to 
consider time as a critical register of empire. With Iza Hussin, I am co-editor of 
“The Travels of Law: Indian Ocean Itineraries” published in Law and History 
Review (Mawani and Hussin, 2014).  
 
As someone who is regularly late, I’ve always thought about time…! Like Sarah 
(and others, I’m sure), I spent a great deal of my career thinking about space, 
reading critical and legal geography. I found this literature compelling but 
always wondered why we didn’t seem to spend as much time talking about time 
(pun intended)! As a colonial legal historian, I found this peculiar. Colonialism, as 
I understood it, was all about time and its reordering. And in my own life, I 
experienced time as a burden, or more specifically, as a register of governance 
(don’t be late!). The idea of time as a critical register of empire has become a 
focus of my current book. 
 
Part of my thinking about time has emerged through a dissatisfaction with the 
ways in which time is discussed in various literatures. Although geographers/ 
historians/ legal scholars often write about time and space and note their 
interconnections, two things seem to happen: 1) space is discussed over time 
(time disappears); and 2) when time is discussed, it is often reduced to history 
and/ or to periodization. The work I am involved in now aims to think about 
time more robustly, to think of things (law, ships, etc.) as having their own 
(multiple) temporalities. 
 
Stacy Douglas: This has been a helpful question to reflect on. It has forced me to 
confront the ways in which my thinking has been stuck to a concern with time 
that I had not yet recognized! It is also telling that I, like Renisa and Sarah, also 
came to time after a prolonged study of space (my earlier work was using Henri 
Lefebvre), and that we all also share an interest in time and colonialism. 
 







Some of my earlier work in the area of law and temporality is concerned with 
law, memory, and memorialization (Douglas, 2011a), as well as the notion of 
“state time” in the modern era (Douglas, 2013). In the latter piece, I explore 
competing critiques of linear time, especially from Carl Schmitt and Walter 
Benjamin, as a device that legitimates an institutionalized concept of politics 
over and above broader conceptions of the political.  
 
When I organized a 2010 panel and subsequent multimedia publication entitled 
Time for Reflection: Considering the ‘Past’, ‘Present’ and ‘Future’ of Feminist Legal 
Scholarship (Douglas, 2011b), I was reading a lot of Walter Benjamin, who 
continues to animate my thinking. However, since then I have also explored the 
role of time beyond periodization (as Renisa helpfully characterized), to think of 
the very conception of time as itself a product of history and a tool in the service 
of legitimizing political projects. For example, I remember being fascinated with 
the French Republican's attempt to re-imagine a new France with a secularized 
calendar that rejected the names and dates of the Gregorian device that 
regulated life under the ancien regime. I even had a widget on my computer that 
gave me the current date in revolutionary decimal time (Don't worry everyone, I 
am not a closet Rousseauian! Even then the paradox of the swapping out of one 
lionized symbol into another was not lost on me.) 
 
But I was also curious about how contemporary discourse about parliamentary 
democracy and especially liberal-democratic constitutionalism relied on 
naturalized notions of time.4 In a piece in the Australian Feminist Law Journal in 
2013, I wrote about how chronological time is used to authorize a very 
institutionalized form of capital "P" politics, and its subsequent effects on the 
limits of our political imaginations (Douglas, 2013). For me, it is interesting that 
we so unthinkingly accept that our notions of time are natural, and not a product 
of a particular historical moment. This isn't to say that we are wrong or should 
change our opinions about time but that at least we should be aware of them. In 
a way, my interest in time is still very Lefebvrian in its approach; time isn't just 
there, it is actively produced. 
 
I am still interested in this question but just thinking about it from another site – 
now, the deployment of time in the narratives of film and literature and its ability 
to shape the audience's sphere of intelligibility. In my current work, I examine 
the literary device whereby central characters wake up one day on the wrong 
side of the law. I am interested in what narratives of violence this particular 
temporal encounter with law allows to be rendered legible and what narratives 
it covers up. I also trace the translation of this device into real world situations 
where it is deployed as a mechanism for garnering sympathy for individuals 
facing indefinite detention, wrongful accusation, and charges relating to national 
security. I don't find the fact that I am writing about the same question 
unfortunate or lamentable (does stating that mean I do, Sigmund?). It seems that 
we are all always asking the same question we started with, just in different 
ways... Another point for Freud, I guess. 
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Amade M’charek: My research has focused on the social aspects of various 
biomedical technologies and practices, such as human genetic diversity, diversity 
in medical practice, and forensic genetics. I have typically conducted 
ethnographies of scientific or clinical practices looking at the entwinement of 
technologies and the objects of study/intervention. My most recent research is 
on face making and race making in forensic identification in which I work 
together with a team of 5 PhDs and 2 post-docs.  In this ethnographic study on 
race in forensic practice, we will examine how technologies of face-making, 
aimed at the identification of a suspect or a victim, are also involved in race-
making. The primary research aim of the RaceFaceID project is to develop 
methods and theoretical concepts with which to understand the simultaneous 
presence and absence of race in science and society.5 By taking into account 
biological factors, this research project will go beyond the social constructivist 
paradigm and unravel the ways in which ‘race’ is shaped as a set of relations 
between the biological, the social and the technical.    !
 
I guess that my turn to time and temporality was prompted by my interest in 
race as an object of studies. Working on human genetic diversity in the tradition 
of actor-network-theory, my research has been showing that in genetic practice 
identities (the individual, population, sex or race) do not inhere in ‘the body’ or 
cannot be reduced to one single marker. Rather they are distributed and come to 
be enacted as a relation between various different kinds of entities (biological, 
cultural etc). So this means that in a good ANT-tradition, identities are spatial; 
they are spatial configurations. Things became tricky when I started to focus my 
research on race. The main question in my work is: what is race made to be in 
practice? So rather than defining race, suggesting that we know what it is, I 
follow what it is made to be ethnographically. And here the problem starts. If we 
do not know what race is how can we recognize it? It is here that I became 
interested in history and in how knowledges, objects, practices from the past 
might resonate with current practices and thus racialize technologies and 
practices that otherwise might be indifferent to race. 
 
In a recent paper, I trace back the history of a genome and show how race figures 
in it (M’charek, 2014). In that paper I started to work with Michel Serres’s spatial 
notion of time (topological time). Time that is not “natural” or “out there”, but 
rather an effect of technologies, interactions, etc. As some of you have already 
indicated time is multiple. And Emily is spot on to suggest that we need an 
ethnography (or was it even a “praxiography” following Annemarie Mol) of time  
(Grabham, 2016). How does time come about, what version of time is being 
produced, and what are the politics of a specific version of time? What kind of 
work does a particular version of time do? 
 
Emily Grabham: When I was working as a “lesbian caseworker” for an 
employment rights organization in the early 2000s, my colleague (the “gay men's 
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caseworker”) spent much of his time on HIV discrimination cases. Much of that 
work was about proving someone's HIV was a “disability” for the purposes of the 
discrimination laws in force at the time. In turn, proving disability was about a 
person's prognosis - whether their HIV was likely in the future to lead to an 
impairment. Prognosis and likelihood acted as sort of temporal legal ghosts for 
my colleague, besetting him with fresh problems and requiring new legal 
strategies. But they weren't immaterial as such. In fact, prognosis and likelihood 
materialized in his life in the form of massive piles of medical reports and other 
medico-legal paperwork about people's lives and health and deliberations over 
the meaning and status of clinical tests: T cell counts, for example. It became very 
difficult for me to think about prognosis without deliberating medical reports, 
and to think about likelihood without all the documentary practices that are 
associated with a disability discrimination claim. 
 
As I came to think in more depth about law and time, I became more preoccupied 
with this question of how temporalities can be materialized in assemblages of 
human and non-human actors. This is quite different from accounts of time that 
presume it to be in some way cohesive or “natural”. Drawing on Jane Bennett's 
work on vibrant matter (Bennett, 2010), for example, I have been thinking about 
the agentic capacities of objects - what she terms their “trending tendency to 
persist” (Bennett, 2010, p. 2) - and how these agentic tendencies can inaugurate 
fresh or specific temporalities in relationship with other elements and actors. 
This thinking forms the basis for my recent book Brewing Legal Times: Things, 
Form, and the Enactment of Law (Grabham, 2016). We might be able, then, to 
think about “likelihood” as a specific type of future-oriented, expectational legal 
temporality, resulting from the interactions of people living with HIV, legal 
activists, tribunals, forms, documentary routines, clinical tests, and T-cells, for 
example. This is an approach that aims to capture the congregational (following 
Bennett) proliferation of temporalities, which might be small or specific or 
marginal but are no less interesting for that. 
 
Emma Cunliffe:!It has been so helpful to read how each of you came to questions 
about time and legal ordering in your own work, and to reflect on the ways in 
which my trajectory has been a bit different (though resonant in many ways with 
Sarah’s and Amade's, in particular).  In my research, I trace the relationships 
between legal knowledge, expert knowledge and normative beliefs about subject 
identity within criminal trial processes.  I am especially interested in moments 
where criminal trials seem particularly apt to fail: primarily, sexual assault and 
child homicide.  The temporal dimension of legal processes is a constant, but 
often unexamined, factor.  Trial transcripts and court records reveal that 
judges and legal actors are driven by time-based constraints: how many 
witnesses will we get through today; how long a lunch break does the jury 
need; how many days do we have set down for this trial?  Time also 
operates in other registers: witnesses are pressed to remember details 
despite the passage of time or disparaged for claiming memories that are 
too vivid or too detailed to account for time lapsed since a relevant 
event; the date on which a law was changed determines the options 
available to the court; the scientific evidence given at trial depends to 






some extent on the theories that prevail within a given field at the time 
of the trial, and law contains no automatic process for revisiting past 
decisions when the science changes; meanwhile a convicted offender “does" 
her time. 
 
In the landmark decision Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993, 
Blackmun J on behalf of a majority of the US Supreme Court held that time works 
differently in science and in law (although – revealingly – he framed it as a 
comment about truth): " … there are important differences between the quest for 
truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific 
conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must 
resolve disputes finally and quickly.” 6 
 
Justice Blackmun's characterizations of law and of science are oversimplified, of 
course, and they have rightly been criticized.  But there is something important 
about this observation, in terms of the pressures of the trial process.  The 
demand to resolve a case now often runs past the limits of expert knowledge, 
and courts are not good at recognizing that moment in which their demand for 
knowledge exceeds present understanding.  I spend a great deal of my research 
time thinking about this intersection of different time scales, and in particular 
about what happens when a development in scientific or medical understanding 
casts doubt on a pre-established legal truth.  In her book Flawed Convictions 
(Tuerkheimer, 2014), Deborah Tuerkheimer points out that the criminal legal 
system in the US has no systematic way to revisit convictions that were obtained 
in part on the basis of discredited scientific testimony. 
 
That’s where Blackmun J’s elision of time and truth is so interesting – law 
strategically makes truth claims, but there are also moments when it disclaims 
its capacity to discern eternal truths.  How does this systemic posture further 
victimize the woman or man who, having been convicted on the basis of expert 
testimony, faces the burden of proving to an indifferent legal community that, in 
light of developments in knowledge, they should now be released?  When the 
shift in scientific knowledge is not from one truth to another – but rather from 
one truth to a recognition of uncertainty – how does a convicted woman or man 
articulate the injustice they have experienced?  This trajectory is shown, for 
example, in the shifting medical understandings of repeat infant death in a single 
family (the Sally Clark, Angela Cannings, Trupti Patel and Kathleen Folbigg cases) 
and in research into shaken baby syndrome or abusive head trauma. 
 
Stacy Douglas: Emma, I am curious about this formulation that you put so 
eloquently: "law strategically makes truth claims, but there are also moments 
when it disclaims its capacity to discern eternal truths". But then "law" can't do 
anything, or can it? Who is the culprit in your opinion? Is it the experts you 
discuss, and their intentional and unintentional reliance on deep legacies of 
racism, sexism, transphobia, etc.? Or is there something in the form of law itself? 
I am thinking here of some kind of Schmittian-inspired remnant of human action 
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that can never quite be captured by an order of rules. How do you think "law" 
gets away with it? 
 
Emily Grabham: Building on this, I think what I find particularly interesting is 
that shift to “uncertainty” amongst scientific communities - how it happens, how 
it's achieved, what it does, and then what happens when that comes into contact 
with law or trials or legal processes with their very different orderings and 
temporalities. It seems to me that Emma’s on-going research sits at the interface 
of this epistemological divide, as it reconstitutes itself. Emma, do you think that 
scientific uncertainty (as opposed to other temporal genres, for want of a better 
word) can ever translate smoothly enough into legal knowledge about time? This 
might also be another way of asking Stacy's question about the form of law: what 
if anything is distinct about law's approach here? 
 
Emma Cunliffe: Stacy’s question about who is the culprit when legal processes 
fail is one I have thought about a lot, of course!  And I have had different answers 
at different moments.  But oddly, having felt for a long time that there is no such 
thing as “law” (and if there is, it certainly can’t be an actor), I have found myself 
circling back to a revised conception of a social and moral force that, for want of 
a better term, I call law.  I haven’t read Schmitt, but I clearly should!  The force I 
have in mind is something that exceeds the work of legal officials, experts and 
other actors in the legal system, and it exceeds the mechanics of legal processes 
themselves.  It seems to exist underneath – and at times resist – the formal law of 
judicial decisions and statutes.  It is more akin to a Gramscian conception of 
hegemony, a normative conception of right and wrong that (among other things) 
induces human actors to participate in and try to make the best of a system that 
has its own centripetal inertia.  In my article, “Judging, Fast and Slow”, I tried to 
think through how implicit bias and stereotypes are implicated in the failure of 
law reform efforts that were intended to protect sexual assault complainants 
from further victimization within the legal process (Cunliffe, 2014).  I try to do 
this by working at the boundaries of law, medicine, theory and empirical studies 
of reasoning.   
 
How does all of this connect with conceptions of time?  The first way is that this 
body of beliefs I have described seems to pre-exist the instant legal case.  It 
operates almost as a palimpsest. I am interested in trying to identify when the 
pre-conscious seeps through and changes the form of what’s written at trial, with 
what results.  Again, we come to method here – my method is to pull apart the 
transcript and court record, which is frustrating and laborious and incomplete, 
but it does allow one to glimpse moments of elision, moments in which the shift 
is made from evidence to belief.  The second way is that various bodies of 
knowledge – now medical, now legal, now psychology – intersect, run past one 
another, have different methods for achieving similar values.  A third is the 
relentless way in which the legal values of judicial efficiency and certainty 
displace claims about uncertainty in trial processes.  I’m not sure if this is just 
how law is – one could equally argue that principles associated with the burden 
and standard of proof evince a deep commitment to the existence of uncertainty, 
but in the transcripts I read, most of the actors – even those who stand to benefit 






from it – seem to resist this commitment.  There is something unsatisfying to 
conceptions of justice about simply saying “I don’t know what happened here.” 
!
Emily Grabham:  We have many shared themes in the discussion so far. Perhaps 
one overarching theme, and I mean very overarching, is how to think political 
time beyond a sense of linear chronology when we’re trying to understand the 
role of law. For example, I was particularly struck with your paper at the 
Diagnosing Legal Temporalities workshop,7 Stacy, which used film as a powerful 
way into thinking about the political possibilities and temporal dimensions of 
arguments about “Kafka-esque” legal dynamics (Douglas, 2015). And as this 
conversation shows, we have turned to courts, ships, museums, films, and land 
registries to begin this work; to begin, as Amade would put it, seeing how time 
“comes about” in relation to law. Even though we are inspired by critical 
scholarship on space, it leaves us wanting more. Do I have that correct? If so, 
where does that leave us thinking time alongside space? And how have we been 
influenced in thinking about this? 
 
Stacy Douglas: Yes, I am looking at how films and novels ask us to understand 
events in particular temporal segments and how time influences the resulting 
conception of justice or legality. In Franz Kafka's The Trial, for example, I wonder 
if Josef K.'s sudden run in with the law actually tells us a quite liberal story about 
experiencing law's violence as occasional, rather than everyday. After all, Josef K. 
must have had a fairly innocuous relationship with law up until the morning of 
his thirtieth birthday; indeed, the whole story relies on the jarring device of 
waking up “one day” on the wrong side of the law, rather than being born into it. 
And then I am also curious about how these narratives of "one dayness" travel 
and get taken up by activists in campaigns to end arbitrary detention or overturn 
wrongful convictions. I am concerned that these temporal narratives continue to 
allow us only to tell very simple stories about deserving and undeserving 
subjects, and mask the more insidious violence and temporalities of everyday 
state practices. 
 
Renisa, I am curious, what took you to Bergson, of all of the possible theorists on 
time? I have always been fascinated by your use of him in particular. 
 
Renisa Mawani: I think Bergson really resonated with me for a number of 
reasons. First, he was very critical of how time had been ignored and/ or 
spatialized both in science and philosophy. I found this very compelling. When 
we talk about time, he says, it is space that "answers our call" (Bergson, 1946, p. 
13). Second, I was quite taken by his efforts to provincialize (if I can use that 
term here) the hubris of humans. Everything exists in time, we just decide what 
that time looks like. Third and perhaps more intuitively, I felt that Bergson gave 
me a useful vocabulary to think about movement, including the movements of 
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law. Finally, I'm very interested in the ways in which Bergson has appealed to 
anti-colonial thinkers. 
 
The question of method is key. How do we study time concretely, without 
reducing it to space, and without making time into periodization or history? It's a 
challenge!  
 
Emily Grabham: We always need to be aware of what “answers the call” when 
we attempt to follow, evoke or describe time. I often find myself thinking in 
spatial terms even tangentially. I'm not always too worried about this, especially 
given the work of Doreen Massey, Mariana Valverde (Valverde, 2015) and 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013) and 
others who think about temporality as they engage with space. But it's just that 
we might find time in strange or unexpected forms. I have been thinking about 
how concatenations of documentary practices, objects, technoscientific practices 
create temporalities which can't then be reduced to specific actors or relations. 
Having said that, sometimes it is possible to get a different view on how a 
temporality became possible by grasping a specific relationship. For example, the 
“manifesting antibodies” legal test that became so important in Canadian law on 
HIV in the late 1980s couldn't have come about without clinical disease 
progression guidelines and the HIV antibody test itself, both of which were 
complex processes. So in terms of method, for me, it's been increasingly about 
accepting that objects, practices and legal technicalities exert their own shades of 
agency in relation to time. By accepting this, time has become intensely material 
and this has blown apart my previous reliance on an idea of time as in some way 
metaphysical or ineffable, ethereal. 
 
Sarah Keenan: Because of my loyalty to Massey it’s hard for me to think about 
this without feeling defensive of space.  Massey’s reading of Bergson is probably 
ungenerous, and some say it is incorrect: she argues that Bergson reduces space 
to representation, and that this is a problem, because space is and must be 
understood to be as difficult to represent as time. Leaving the debate over 
Massey’s reading of Bergson aside, for me what is important is that space and 
time are always connected, and neither should reduce or be reduced to the other. 
 
When I began thinking about time and land title registration, my focus was on 
the fact that the registry creates legally authoritative histories for each parcel of 
registered land.  In the Australian and Canadian contexts, these histories 
conveniently exclude any record of pre-colonial ownership.  The blatantly 
artificial history created for registered land might be seen as a truth claim by 
law, although it is not framed in quite those terms, and I think the most insidious 
damage perpetuated by the temporal order of the land title registry is that it is 
productive of race.  Connecting with Amade’s work, it is productive of a category 
which comes to be recognizable as race: those with un-registerable, pre-colonial 
connections with land, those rendered out of place on the land and subject to 
lawful dispossession, they are “Indigenous”.  Of course the temporality of title 
registration is just one method of racialization, but I think a particularly subtle 
and devastating one. 







I had been thinking about land and registered title as out of sync when I came 
across Michelle Bastian’s work on the performative nature of telling the time 
(Bastian, 2012).  I read Bastian’s article as arguing that telling the time using 
clocks in this era of climate change helps us to coordinate ourselves for the daily 
requirements of capitalism, but is actually causing us to be “fatally confused” in 
regard to the potential imminence of environmental catastrophe.  Using Bastian’s 
work, I have been thinking about title registries as clocks, because they are 
“devices that signal change in order for their users to maintain an awareness of, 
and thus be able to coordinate themselves with, what is significant to them” 
(Bastian, 2012, p. 31). Registries signal change in legal title so that buyers, sellers 
and lenders can coordinate with each other; the colonial history of the land and 
contemporary claims to sovereignty over it are simply not part of the 
calculation.   
 
Renisa Mawani: Sarah, I love the idea of land title registration as a kind of 
"clock". I certainly see legal time (whatever that means at/ in the moment) as a 
mode of imposing certainty on uncertainty...a way of imposing order on 
continual movement, to evoke Bergson, a way of rendering intelligible. 
 
I am intrigued by the discussion of race thus far. To return to the question of 
method, how might we think about race and temporality? This is a question not 
just for Amade and Sarah, but everyone/anyone. 
 
Emma Cunliffe: Amade’s work on the ways in which past understandings of race 
might infuse present technologies that appear on their face to be raceless or 
neutral is so important, as is her observation that this is (deeply) a method 
question.  Her insights have great resonance with other strands within the child 
homicide transcripts I read.  Law cleaves to the illusion that race is not relevant 
to the formal determination of guilt.  This makes it difficult to investigate how 
stereotypes about race play out in individual trials.  In the wrongful child 
homicide convictions that occurred in Ontario between 1991 and 2003, for 
example, Indigenous families and Jamaican-Canadian families were over-
represented.  And yet in his Commission of Inquiry, Goudge JA interpreted his 
terms of reference (to investigate the systemic factors that led to errors being 
made) in a manner that paid little or no attention to the role of racialization and 
racism in the work of forensic pathologists and in the work of the courts.  The 
characterization of these cases as failed science precludes a characterization of 
them as being (also) failures generated by racism, by the poverty of racialized 
groups including Indigenous communities.  We live in a time in which liberal 
conceptions of formal equality make race unspeakable and this affects what 
injustices we see, and respond to. 
 
Sarah Keenan: I have been thinking about race and time in three ways. First, 
temporalities are productive of social belonging, and thus of categories which 
come to be recognizable (I am referencing Amade here) as race.  I began thinking 
about this in my work on diaspora, noting how adhering to particular cultural 
calendars is an important practice in the reproduction of diasporic communities. 







This makes me think of a pleasant childhood memory - celebrating Chinese New 
Year.  For all my white friends, the festive season would come to a predictable 
end with January 1, but I always had the Toowoomba Chinese Year New dinner 
to look forward to.  Being based on a lunar calendar the date changes every year, 
with a different animal welcomed in at each shift along the 12-year cycle. 
Together with the two or three other Chinese families in town, we would go to a 
restaurant and eat from a banquet that included whole steamed fish and fried ice 
cream.  I felt a strong sense of cultural pride and belonging at these dinners, and 
“Gong Hey Fat Choy” (“Happy New Year”) was one of the few Cantonese phrases 
I managed to learn from my mum. 
 
Second, the positioning of subjects along legal timelines can be (re)productive of 
categories which come to be recognizable as race.  That’s the timeline of land 
title registration for my work, but for Emily and perhaps Amade there are 
medical timelines accepted or coproduced by law which have a similar 
effect. And third, I have been working with Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s definition of 
racism as “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of 
group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (Wilson Gilmore, 2007, p. 
247).  So this is a definition of racism that explicitly links race with a temporal 
indicator. 
 
Emily previously asked me about my experience in practice. One thing I 
remember as a trainee solicitor is traveling to Palm Island in 2006 for one of the 
hearings of the coronial inquiry into the 2004 death in custody of Cameron 
Mulrunji Doomadgee.  We were there to hear evidence of previous brutality 
against Aboriginal people by the officer in question, Sergeant Hurley.  In one 
exchange, the barrister for the state kept pushing Barbara Pilot, the witness, to 
clarify what time it was when, in early 2004, she alleged that Hurley had driven 
his police car over her foot, causing a compound fracture so severe that her bone 
was protruding.  Barbara Pilot was a softly spoken and timid witness, but when 
she answered “it was Murri time” to the sound of hushed, approving laughter 
from her supporters in the room, she won the exchange.  The barrister did not 
have a response.  He tried to laugh along with the room, but in one short 
sentence she had revealed his line of questioning as bullying, pernickety and 
illegitimate.  Though it was just a moment, the violence and illegitimacy of the 
colonial legal system in Palm Island felt exposed and even vulnerable in the 
courtroom.  It was this idea of “moments of decolonization” that I was trying to 
think through in the article I wrote on that idea for Stacy and Suzanne Lenon’s 
special issue on “Law and Decolonization” in the Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society a couple of years ago (Keenan, 2014). 
 
Emily Grabham: I think the phrase “it was Murri time” encapsulates why it is so 
important, and so generative, to think about race and time. This kind of enquiry 
also splits, and illuminates existing fissures in, the time of the nation state, 
whether those national projects are marked by settler colonialism or other 
racializing institutions or practices. Colonial time is on-going as a form of 
ordering and is created at least partly through law and specific legal registers. 
I'm thinking here about your work on immigration status Renisa, and your work 






on land registries, Sarah. David Scott has written eloquently about the 
temporalities of postcolonial politics during and after the Grenada revolution. Of 
those inspired by Marxist anti-imperial and socialist politics in the 1970s, and 
then affected by the revolution's failure, he states: “... they were like leftovers 
from a former future stranded in the present” (Scott, 2014, p. 5). So it is not just 
that unearthing racializing and colonial times recovers a range of political 
experiences and possibilities beyond something like “hegemonic” national time, 
but also that political ontologies temporalize people and movements in specific 
ways, leaving them adrift or stranded. And yet time can also be re-seized, as 
happened in Sarah’s anecdote about “Murri time”. 
 
Amade M’charek:  If I may, I would like to add two (somewhat longer) remarks. 
My first remark is a reflection on the conversation about different modes of 
truth-making (scientific and legal truth), initiated by Emma. Although I can very 
much relate to the difference between scientific and legal modes of doing truth I 
was also wondering whether this difference is a “momentary” end result rather 
that what we see happening in practice (like a still in a movie). I was reminded of 
a Dutch case that I (together with two colleagues) had worked on in which we 
analysed the DNA evidence in a rape/murder case, in the early 90’s (M’charek et 
al., 2013). This N-case was a very complicated case: there was hardly any 
evidence except for a little DNA (found in sperm cells in the body of the young 
boy). But there was no technology available to extract the little DNA for further 
research. The evidence was thus sent to Germany. But there the proper 
technology was still to be developed which would take more than 2 years. The 
suspect was held in custody. The defence objected that waiting for more than 
two years for scientific evidence can hardly be qualified as an activity of truth 
finding. Although he initially accepted this delay, the defence would later try to 
get the case dismissed on the basis of ‘‘reasonable term.’’ This legal principle 
states that criminal investigations should conclude within a reasonable time, 
generally determined on a period of two years. According to the defence, the 
prosecution’s ‘‘inactivity’’ was in conflict with the terms of the European Court 
for Human Rights. The suspect was released but the case was not dismissed. 
 
The DNA evidence was then delivered in 1995. The suspect was immediately 
arrested. But the defence argued that the DNA evidence was not admissible 
because it was not produced according to the freshly (in September 1994) 
introduced Dutch DNA law.  
 
Now here three different chronological temporalities are interfering with one 
another (chronological at this more general level, but I am sure that if we would 
look more closely other versions of time will emerge): 1) the temporality of the 
court and legal practice; 2) that of scientific practices; 3) that of politico-
legislative practice (resulting in a new law).  
 
As things became even more interesting and complicated in this case, it was the 
very mixture of legal and scientific truth making that saved the day. One of the 
DNA experts (a geneticist) was assigned to answer whether the DNA evidence 







from Germany was scientifically sound and legally admissible (!).  He became the 
key actor in this case.  
 
I share this with you because I think it is a nice case to think about the 
heterogeneity that is going on in the everyday legal practice; just before the gavel 
falls there much more admixture going on that deserves our attention. Probably 
because it might help us to grasp the normativities of legal practices.  (I should 
tell you that I did not work on temporalities in this case, but this conversation 
has made me want to revisit the case with newly gained insights. It would be 
great to also look more closely at the process that Emma describes about tracing 
how evidence slips into belief and the other way around!) 
 
My second remark is prompted by a question Sarah has raised about the relation 
between temporality and belonging. And for me this resonates with Emma’s 
remark on the intersection of different time scales. Such intersections might in 
one practice cast doubt, but in others actually help to produce modes of 
belonging. I am thinking in particular of genetic archaeology. Picture an 
excavation in the middle of a European city. An open area and citizens pass by. 
Many artefacts but also bones and human skeletons. Quite often such 
excavations reveal remains from the Middle Ages. What strikes me is that local 
people often feel a distance between them/us-here and those bones/them-there 
(there might even be disgust at the sight of skeletons). The skeletons are fitted 
easily on the chronological/modernist time scale, producing a distance, pointing 
at a time that has passed. Once DNA enters the scene, the same old bones become 
us; ancestors. In many projects in the Netherlands I have seen people engaging 
fervently with their ancestors and willing to establish a genetic link with these 
human remains. So it seems to me that whereas the skeletons produce a 
thousand years’ distance, DNA produces a different kind of temporality. DNA 
produces immediacy. It crosses this thousand years by producing (the possibility 
of) a similarity between the DNA in the bones (there) and that in a person’s body 
(here). In the universe of Michel Serres DNA folds time and undoes the distance 
between past and presence, contributing to a sense of belonging. 
     
So I wonder whether the very intersection between these temporalities produces 
a stronger sense of belonging. Can it be that a sense of belonging becomes 
stronger as a result of a simultaneous proximity and distance? Can it be that the 
co-existence/co-production of topological/folded time and 
modern/chronological time (time line) is productive of belonging? And does the 
distance somehow contribute to a sense nativism/exclusive belonging? 
 
Emily Grabham: Amade, your contribution is so rich and much appreciated. 
Even though I don’t want this conversation to end, we have sadly run out of time. 
Thank you so very much to everyone for your thoughtful conversation over the 
past few days. It really has been a pleasure to watch the exchanges unfold and I 
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